Battle at Bukit Chandu (14 February 1942)

    
       On 14 February, the Japanese again launched a heavy attack at 8.30am, supported by intense mortar and artillery fire, on the front held by the 1st Malay Brigade.The defenders beat off this and a number of other attacks. The fighting included bitter hand-to-hand combat, and losses from both sides were heavy. At 4.00pm an attack supported by tanks eventually succeeded in penetrating the left, and the defenders on this flank were forced back to a line from the junction of the Ayer Rajah and Depot Road through the Brick Works and along the canal to Bukit Chermin. Owing to the failure of units on both its flanks to hold their ground, the 1st Malay Brigade withdrew at 2.30pm. It was at this point that C Company of the Malay Regiment received instructions to move to a new defence position, Bukit Chandu.
Bukit Chandu (means "Opium Hill" in Malay) was named after an opium-processing factory located at the foot of the hill. This was also where C Company of the Malay Regiment made their final stand against the Japanese attack. Bukit Chandu was a key defence position for two important reasons. It was situated on high ground overlooking the island to the north; and secondly, if the Japanese gained control of the ridge, it gave them direct passage to the Alexandra area. The British army had its main ammunition and supply depots, military hospital and other key installations located in Alexandra.
C Company's position was separated from D Company by a big canal. Oil was burning in the canal, which flowed from Normanton Depot. The burning oil prevented C Company soldiers from retreating further south. The company was under the command of Captain H. R. Rix, a British officer. He encouraged the men to defend Bukit Chandu down to the last soldier, and was killed,together with many of his Malay Regiment soldiers in the last defensive battle at Pasir Panjang.
The Japanese pressed their attack on Bukit Chandu in the afternoon, but under the guise of a deception. They sent a group of soldiers, dressed in Punjabi uniforms, passing themselves off as Indian soldiers in the British army. C Company saw through this trick as they knew that soldiers of the British army usually marched in a line of three whereas the disguised soldiers were in a line of four. When they reached the Malay Regiment's defensive line, C Company's squad opened fire, killing several men. Those who survived escaped downhill.
Last stand
Two hours later, the Japanese launched an all-out banzai charge in great numbers. The attack overwhelmed the Malay Regiment, and the defence line shattered. Greatly outnumbered and short of ammunition and supplies, the Malay Regiment continued to resist the Japanese. Both sides engaged in fierce hand-to-hand combat using bayonets. Adnan bin Saidi was seriously wounded but refused to retreat or surrender and instead encouraged his men to fight to the end.
Soon after, Pasir Panjang was under Japanese control, and Adnan bin Saidi, wounded and unable to fight, was captured. Instead of taking him prisoner, the Japanese continuously kicked, punched and beat him before tying him to a cherry tree and stabbing him to death with their bayonets.
Aftermath
The battle of Pasir Panjang had little strategic significance. From a purely military operational perspective, the Battle of Pasir Panjang could not change the outcome of the fate of Singapore and it was a matter of time before the British would surrender to the Japanese 25th Army. The Allied units stationed there were simply tasked with defending the approach to the ridge, but instead had to resist the main invasion force. Opium Hill itself is situated on high ground overlooking the island to the north; and it control the direct passage to the Alexandra area where the British army had its main ammunition and supply depots, military hospital and other key installations located in the Alexandra area. The fall of Opium Hill allow Japan access to Alexandra area, indirectly contribute to Alexandra Hospital massacre.
Adnan bin Saidi is described by many Singaporeans and Malaysians today as a hero for his actions on Bukit Chandu—he encouraged his men not to surrender and instead fight to the death. In Singaporean and Malaysian school textbooks, he is also credited as the soldier who noticed the error in the marching style of the Japanese soldiers disguised as Indian troops.


Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Pasir_Panjang#Bukit_Chandu

Battle of Kranji (9–10 February 1942)

The Battle of Kranji was the second stage of the Empire of Japan's plan for the invasion of Singapore during the Second World War. On 9 February 1942 the Imperial Japanese Army assaulted the north-western front of the British colony of Singapore. Their primary objective was to secure a second beachhead after their successful assault at Sarimbun Beach on 8 February, in order to breach the Jurong-Kranji defence line as part of their southward thrust towards the heart of Singapore City. Defending the shoreline between the Kranji River and the Johor–Singapore Causeway was the Australian 27th Brigade, led by Brigadier Duncan Maxwell, and one irregular company. On 10 February the Japanese forces suffered their heaviest losses while moving up the Kranji River, which caused them to panic and nearly aborted the operation. However, a series of miscommunications and withdrawals by Allied forces in the ensuing battles allowed the Japanese to swiftly gain strategic footholds, which eventually led to the fall of Singapore on 15 February 1942.

9 February 1942: Japanese landings

On 9 February, two divisions of the Japanese Twenty Fifth Army, led by Lieutenant General Tomoyuki Yamashita, landed on the northwestern coast of Singapore, in the Sarimbun area. Yamashita's headquarters (HQ) was in the Sultan of Johor's palace on Istana Bukit Serene, which offered him and his officers a bird's eye view of virtually every key target in the northern sector of Singapore Island, only 1.6 kilometres (one mile) across the Straits of Johor. Sultan Ibrahim's palace was not fired upon by the British because any damage caused would have extensive repercussions for British-Johor ties.
The primary objective of the Japanese at Kranji was to capture Kranji village; this would let them repair the demolished Causeway in order to facilitate easy flow of reinforcements and supplies down the roads of Woodlands and Mandai, and to the rest of the island for their vanguard force. Once the leading wave of Japanese was safely ashore, the massed Japanese artillery switched their fire to the defensive positions at Kranji. Telegraph and telephone communications were destroyed in the bombardment and communications between the front line and command HQ were broken. At 8:30pm that night, the men of the Imperial Guards Division began the crossing from Johor in special armoured landing-crafts, collapsible boats and by swimming.

10 February 1942: Heavy losses

In the early hours of 10 February, Japanese forces suffered their heaviest losses during the Battle of Singapore. While moving up the Kranji River, advance landing parties from the 4th Regiment of the Imperial Guard Division found themselves under heavy fire from Australian machine gunners and mortar teams. They also found themselves surrounded by oil slicks, which had been created by Allied personnel emptying the nearby Woodlands oil depot, to prevent its capture. A scenario feared by Yamashita came to pass by accident; the oil was set alight by Allied small arms fire, causing many Japanese soldiers to be burnt alive. Sustaining heavy losses, Nishimura requested permission to abandon the operation. However, Yamashita denied the request.
Maxwell, who had limited communications with his division headquarters, was concerned that his force would be cut off by fierce and chaotic fighting at Sarimbun and Jurong to the south west, involving the Australian 22nd Brigade. Maxwell's force consequently withdrew from the seafront. This allowed the Japanese to land in increasing strength and take control of Kranji village. They also captured Woodlands, and began repairing the causeway, without encountering any Allied attacks.
Japanese light tanks, which had good buoyancy, were towed across the straits to Lim Chu Kang Road where they joined the battle at dusk. With reinforced troops and tanks advancing down Choa Chua Kang Road, the Australian troops were no match for the tanks and fled to the hills of Bukit Panjang. The 5th Division (Imperial Japanese Army) captured Bukit Timah village by the evening of 11 February.

Aftermath

By 11 February, the Jurong-Kranji Defence Line was left undefended which allowed the Japanese forces to sweep through the Line to attack Bukit Timah.On the same day, Percival finally moved his Combined Operations Headquarters in Sime Road to the underground bunker, The Battle Box at Fort Canning.
Despite their fighting spirit, the Dalforce fighters suffered from poor training and the lack of equipment. A further blow was delivered when the 27th Australian Brigade withdrew southwards. As a result, the Japanese established a stronghold in the northern Woodlands area and secured a relatively easy passage into the island. General Wavell left Singapore for Java early on 11 February and sent a cable to British Prime Minister Winston Churchill in London on his assessment of the war front in Singapore:

Battle for Singapore is not going well... I ordered Percival to stage counter-attack with all troops possible... Morale of some troops is not good and none is as high as I should like to see... The chief troubles are lack of sufficient training in some reinforcing troops and an inferior complex which bold Japanese tactics and their command of the air have caused. Everything possible is being done to produce more offensive spirit and optimistic outlook. But I cannot pretend that these efforts have been entirely successful up to date. I have given the most categorical orders that there is to be no thought of surrender and that all troops are to continue fighting to the end...

By 12 February, the Imperial Guards had captured the reservoirs and Nee Soon village. The defending troops, by this time, were badly shaken. Thousands of exhausted and frightened stragglers left the fighting to seek shelter in large buildings. On the same night, British forces in the east of the island had begun to withdraw towards the city.
On 13 February, the Japanese 5th Division continued its advance and reached Adam and Farrer Roads to capture the Sime Road Camp. Yamashita moved his HQ forward to the bomb-damaged Ford Factory in Bukit Timah. Heading southwards, the Japanese 18th Division advanced into Pasir Panjang, where the last major battle of Singapore would be fought with the Malay Regiments at Bukit Chandu.
Source:http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_kranji

Operation Clean Up (Sook Ching Operation)

 

 

"the Chinese in Singapore were regarded as anti-Japanese even before the Japanese military landed."

the purge was planned before Japanese troops landed in Singapore. The military government section of the 25th Army had already drawn up a plan entitled, "Implementation Guideline for Manipulating Overseas Chinese" on or around 28 December 1941. This guideline stated that anyone who failed to obey or cooperate with the occupation authorities should be eliminated. It is clear that the headquarters of the 25th Army had decided on a harsh policy toward the Chinese population of Singapore and Malaya from the beginning of the war. According to Onishi Satoru, the Kempeitai officer in charge of the Jalan Besar screening centre, Kempeitai commander Oishi Masayuki was instructed by the chief of staff, Suzuki Sosaku, at Keluang, Johor, to prepare for a purge following the capture of Singapore. Although the exact date of this instruction is not known, the Army headquarters was stationed in Keluang from 28 January to 4 February 1942. Clearly, then, the Singapore Massacre was not the conduct of a few evil people, but was consistent with approaches honed and applied in the course of a long period of Japanese aggression against China and subsequently applied to other Asian countries. To sum up the points developed above, the Japanese military, in particular the 25th Army, made use of the purge to remove prospective anti-Japanese elements and to threaten local Chinese and others in order to swiftly impose military administration.
Target Group

• Activists in the China Relief Fund
• Wealthy men who had contributed generously to the China Relief Fund
• Adherents of Tan Kah Kee, leader of the Nanyang National Salvation Movement
• Hainan people, perceived to be communists
• China-born Chinese who came to Malaya after the Second Sino-Japanese War
• Men with tattoos, perceived to be triad members
• Chinese who joined the Singapore Overseas Chinese Anti-Japanese Volunteer Army
• Civil servants and those who were likely to sympathise with the British, such as the Justices of the Peace, and members of the Legislative Council
• People who possessed weapons and were likely to disrupt public security

Yamashita instructed the Syonan garrison to cooperate with the Syonan Kempeitai, the Japanese military police, to "punish hostile Chinese severely"

Execution

There were several sites for the killings, the most notable ones being Changi Beach, Punggol Beach and Sentosa (or Pulau Blakang Mati). The Punggol Beach Massacre saw about 300 to 400 Chinese shot at Punggol Beach on 28 February 1942 by the Hojo Kempei firing squad. The victims were some of the 1,000 Chinese males detained by the Japanese after a door-to-door search along Upper Serangoon Road. Several of these men had tattoos, a sign that they could be triad members.
The current Changi Beach Park was the site of one of the most brutal killings in Singaporean history. On 20 February 1942, 66 Chinese males were lined up along the edge of the sea and shot by the military police. The beach was the first of the killing sites of the Sook Ching massacre, with another one at Tanah Merah. Another site was Berhala Reping at Sentosa Beach (now Serapong Golf Course after land reclamation). Surrendered British gunners awaiting Japanese internment buried some 300 bullet-ridden corpses washed up on the shore of Sentosa. They were civilians who were transported from the docks at Tanjong Pagar to be killed at sea nearby.
In a quarterly newsletter, the National Heritage Board published the account of the life story of a survivor named Chia Chew Soo whose father, uncles, aunts, brothers and sisters were bayoneted one by one by Japanese soldiers in Simpang Village.

Death Toll

The figures of the death toll vary. Official Japanese statistics show fewer than 5,000 while the Singaporean Chinese community claims the numbers to be around 100,000. Lee Kuan Yew, Singapore's first prime minister, said in a Discovery Channel programme that the estimated death toll was, "Somewhere between 50,000 to 100,000 young men, Chinese".
In an interview on 6 July 2009 with National Geographic, Lee said:

I was a Chinese male, tall and the Japanese were going for people like me because Singapore had been the centre for the collection of ethnic Chinese donations to Chongqing to fight the Japanese. So they were out to punish us. They slaughtered 70,000 - perhaps as high as 90,000 but verifiable numbers would be about 70,000. But for a stroke of fortune, I would have been one of them.

I feel that the Japanese was merciless at killing and torturing people and their main target is chinese. and i cant imagine if i am in that situation i would open my door and see a Japanese soldier searching for chinese male to kill. it would be horrifying for me to see my father getting dragged out of the house and getting killed. Lee Kuan Yew is a very LUCKY survival as it would be so hard to escape from the killing of people that the Japanese did.

Source: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Sook_Ching_massacre( Date Accessed:13 Feb 2013)